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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker' made
possible significant improvements in federal sentencing. There is
no doubt that improvements are needed. Under the mandatory
sentencing guidelines, the federal prison system became the larg-
est in the nation. 2 It is filled far over capacity with large numbers
of non-violent and first-time offenders, 3 the majority of whom were
convicted of drug trafficking. 4 The increased spending on federal
prisons has not been shown to decrease crime. 5 Sentences often
fail to track the seriousness of the crime, the dangerousness of the
offender, or any other purpose of sentencing. Unwarranted sen-
tencing disparity-the problem that had motivated sentencing
reform in the first place-was not reduced in the system as a
whole.6 The great experiment of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 [hereinafter "SRA"], which established the United States
Sentencing Commission and directed it to promulgate sentencing
guidelines, had veered off course. The political branches of gov-
ernment proved unwilling or unable to steer it toward the fair and
cost-effective sentencing system that the SRA had promised.
In Booker and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court sketched a
framework for increased judicial control of sentencing, but the
framework is not complete or self-executing. It requires the active
participation of judges, who are to evaluate the guidelines' rec-
ommendations against the principles and purposes of sentencing.
It requires the participation of the Sentencing Commission, which
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2007 (Dec. 2008)
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=903.
3. The Sentencing Project, The Federal Prison Population: A Statistical Analysis,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/AdminDocuments/publications/inc -federalprisonpop.pdf.
4. Transcript of Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n at 9-10, 55 (Mar.
17, 2011) (testimony of Harley G. Lappin, Director Federal Bureau of Prisons, noting that
fifty-two percent of federal inmates are serving "extremely long' sentences for drug related
offenses, second in severity only to sex offenders).
5. Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Sentencing Policy; or,
Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2001) (noting
that "the Commission has yet to address that task [of measuring the guidelines effective-
ness] in any way"); Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines (and Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV 1017, 1039 (2004)
(arguing that "the guidelines have not been proven to be too severe" but acknowledging
that "no comprehensive [cost/benefit] assessment of federal sentences has been performed").
6. See discussion infra.
Vol. 49676
Beyond the Heartland
is to learn from the feedback it receives from judges and amend
the guidelines as necessary. It also requires the cooperation of the
Department of Justice and Congress.
For Booker to reach its potential, judges must turn their atten-
tion from calculating the guideline range to examining the partic-
ular guideline-how it was developed, what the Commission says,
or does not say, about how it achieves the purposes of sentencing,
and the research evidence on its fairness and effectiveness. Not
surprisingly, making this switch has been difficult. The first part
of this paper will review some of the problems that plagued pre-
Booker sentencing. The next part will summarize the framework
sketched by the court in Booker and subsequent cases for the criti-
cal evaluation and evolution of the guidelines and contrasts this
framework with pre-Booker jurisprudence. Finally, procedural
obstacles and legalistic distinctions that have confused and need-
lessly complicated sentencing will be reviewed, with an eye toward
convincing judges to embrace their new power to make the system
more fair and effective.
I. THE REALITY OF PRE-BOOKER SENTENCING
Booker rendered the guidelines "effectively advisory" by excising
provisions of the SRA that required judges to sentence within the
guideline range in ordinary circumstances. Sentencing judges
were directed to implement remaining provisions, especially 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which requires judges to impose sentences that
are "sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to comply with the
purposes of sentencing and to "consider" a number of additional
factors, including the federal sentencing guidelines and policy
statements.7 The Court also excised provisions that established a
de novo standard of review for sentences outside the guideline
range and directed appellate courts to review all sentences for
"reasonableness."
These changes reduced the dominance of the guidelines in sen-
tencing decisions. But Justice Breyer, the author of the remedial
opinion and a former Sentencing Commissioner, argued that the
advisory system would still move sentencing in the direction Con-
gress intended when it enacted the SRA.8 Excessive unwarranted
disparities would be avoided even as individualization of sentenc-
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
8. "[Tjhe Act without its 'mandatory' provision and related language remains con-
sistent with Congress' initial and basic sentencing intent." Booker, 543 U. S. at 264.
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es increased. The advisory guidelines would remain relevant, he
reasoned, and judges would generally accept their recommenda-
tions because the procedures set out in the SRA for how the guide-
lines should be developed and amended help ensure that, at least
in ordinary cases, the guidelines provide useful advice about what
sentences best comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 9 In addition to
purpose-driven development, the guidelines were to be revised in
light of feedback from judges1 ° and other research.11
A. Realities of Guideline Development and Implementation
This reasoning, however sound in theory, is curiously oblivious
to actual experience and practice under the mandatory guidelines.
The original Commission could not agree on a theory for the guide-
lines and instead turned to data on past sentencing practices.
12
Even then, only some of the initial guidelines were actually based
on this data. Congress enacted mandatory minimum penalty stat-
utes, which constrained and shaped the Commission's work. The
Commission increased penalties for other types of crime on its own
initiative, and excluded many relevant offense and offender char-
acteristics that judges had historically taken into account. The
Commission's Fifteen Year Review noted that "the Commission's
priorities and policymaking agenda have been greatly influenced
by congressional directives and other crime legislation" which "by-
pass the processes of policy development outlined in the SRA."
1 3
Congress betrayed sentencing reform through piecemeal legisla-
tion enacted in reaction to sensational crimes, such as the over-
9. The statute states these purposes as:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2010).
10. The Commission was to periodically "review and revise [the guidelines], in consid-
eration of comments and data coming to its attention... " 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2010).
11. The Commission was to develop guidelines to advance the purposes of sentencing
and also develop "means of measuring the degree to which sentencing, penal, and correc-
tional practices are effective in meeting" those purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2) (2010).
12. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003).
13. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of
How Well the Federal Criminal Justice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform,
145 (2004)
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research-Projects[Miscellaneous/15-Year-Study/15-year-st
udy-full.pdf [hereinafter "Fifteen Year Review"].
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dose death of basketball star Len Bias and other media-driven
fears. 14 As a result, the guidelines today represent a hodge-podge
of punishments, many directly influenced by legislation enacted
without benefit of empirical research or input from judges. The
guidelines are not carefully tuned instruments designed to comply
with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Because the Commission did not, and often could not, explain
how the guidelines were designed to recommend sentences "suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary" to advance the statutory
purposes, judges were left without the intellectual tools needed for
reasoned application of the guidelines to individual defendants. 5
How can judges recognize when a guideline is not working as in-
tended if no one explains how it was meant to work? Probation
officers and judges developed a habit of mechanical application,
applying a guideline according to its literal terms without analysis
of whether it truly complied with § 3553(a). Drug offenders, for
example, were imprisoned based largely on amount and type of
drug on the assumption that there was some unstated reason to
expect this to satisfy the statute. The jurisprudence of depar-
tures-the theory of when a sentence outside the guideline range
might be preferable to the guidelines' recommendations-
developed around an ill-defined concept of "heartland" rather than
a purpose-driven analysis of when the guidelines fail to comply
with the statute. The guidelines became an end in themselves
14. Henry Scott Wallace, Mandatory Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing Reform:
A Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 40 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 158 (1993); Sara Sun Beale,
The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006). Eric Sterling, counsel to the House Judi-
ciary Committee at the time the Ant-Drug Abuse Act was passed establishing quantity-
based mandatory minimum penalties for most drug offenses, described the process as "like
an auction house . . . It was this frenzied, panic atmosphere-I'll see you five years and
raise your five years. It was the crassest political poker game." Michael Isikoff & Tracy
Thompson, Getting Too Tough on Drugs: Draconian Sentences Hurt Small Offenders More
Than Kingpins, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at C1, C2.
15. The Commission asserted in its amicus curiae brief filed in Rita and Claiborne that
it "has explained how it has taken the statutory purposes of punishment into account in
formulating the Guidelines." Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Claiborne v United States and Rita v. United States in
the Supreme Court of the United States, Nos. 06-5618 & 06-5754 (Jan. 22, 2007). To sup-
port this proposition the Commission cited its Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13 which
was written by the present author when he was employed at the Commission. However,
the relevant portion of the Fifteen Year Review cites, and was based upon, a law review
article also co-written by the present author, Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 12. This
article makes clear that the Commission never explained how the guidelines comply with
the statutory purposes and that it is up to judges to provide the rationalizing interpretation
the Commission failed to supply and to reject particular guideline recommendations that
are inconsistent with the statute.
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rather than a means to the ends Congress had established in §
3553(a).
B. Failure to Achieve the Goals of Sentencing Reform
These failures of implementation naturally resulted in failure to
achieve the ambitious goals of the SRA. The Fifteen Year Review
concluded that under the mandatory guidelines "the goals of sen-
tencing reform have been only partially achieved."'16 While reduc-
tion of disparity was the most important goal of sentencing re-
form, there is little doubt that total unwarranted disparity was
greater under the mandatory guidelines than it was prior to their
implementation. 17 Unwarranted disparity must be defined in rela-
tion to the purposes of sentencing and assessed in the system as a
whole and not merely at one stage or decision. By this measure,
disparity from other sources increased even as disparities among
judges due to philosophical differences were modestly reduced.
Disparities were created by prosecutors' charging and plea-
bargaining decisions. If mandatory guidelines or statutes restrict
judicial discretion while empowering prosecutors to control sen-
tences through charging and plea-bargaining, sentencing disparity
may actually increase. Congress directed the Sentencing Commis-
sion to promulgate policy statements to govern judicial review and
acceptance of plea agreements to avoid this possibility.'8 But these
policy statements and other mechanisms did not work or worked
only in one direction-to increase sentences. The Commission's
Fifteen Year Review concluded, "fj]udicial review of plea agree-
ments ... appears to be very limited" and "disparate treatment of
similar offenders is common at presentencing stages."' 9 The De-
partment of Justice made feeble, and ultimately futile, attempts to
control prosecutor decision-making, but soon came to appreciate
the increased power that mandatory guidelines and penalty stat-
16. Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 144.
17. For an exhaustive summary of the empirical research, see Chapters Three and Four
of the Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13.
18. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Chapter Six, Part B. The Intro-
duction to these policy statements explains that their purpose is "to ensure that plea nego-
tiation practices . . . do not perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparity." USSG § 6B1.1
Introductory Comment (2010).
19. Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 144, 92; see also David N. Adair, Jr. & Toby




utes gave them. 20 Despite the evidence of prosecutor-created dis-
parity, the Department of Justice and its allies in Congress in-
creasingly focused on judicial discretion as the sole source of dis-
parity.
21
The mandatory system also created structural disparity, which
results from rigid compliance with guidelines that fail to track the
policies and principles of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Many penalties rec-
ommended by the mandatory guidelines were far greater than
necessary. The lengthy terms of imprisonment for distribution of
crack cocaine treated less serious offenses the same as very seri-
ous ones.22 The so-called career offender guideline treats repeat
drug offenders the same as far more dangerous offenders, and im-
prisons them longer than data on their recidivism rates would jus-
tify.23 One of the most shocking facts about the mandatory guide-
line era was that the gap between average sentences for African-
American and other offenders actually increased, due to guidelines
that had "a greater adverse impact on Black offenders than did
the factors taken into account by judges in the discretionary sys-
tem..., prior to the guidelines implementation."
24
C. The Need for a New Framework
The many problems with the mandatory guideline system led
practitioners and experts to declare federal sentencing reform a
20. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Dis-
cretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1425 (2008) (the guidelines system "provided prosecutors with
indecent power relative to both defendants and judges, in large part because of prosecutors'
ability to threaten full application of the severe Sentencing Guidelines.").
21. The apex of this collusion was passage of the sentencing provisions contained in the
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003), which eliminated judges' discre-
tion to depart in sex offenses against children and reduced it across the board. See Daniel
Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds -The Center Doesn't, 117
YALE L.J. 1374, 1388 (2008) ("[T]he measure might be better characterized as a DOJ project
in which congressional allies willingly joined. The sponsor, Congressman Tom Feeney (R.
Fla.), appears to have been carrying water for a drafting group that included Justice De-
partment officials and a former AUSA working for House Judiciary Chairman Sensenbren-
ner.').
22. Penalties for crack were finally reduced, although not equated with similar
amounts of powder cocaine, subsequent to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
220.
23. See, e.g., Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 133-134 (showing that the career
offender guideline treats many less dangerous offenders the same as other offenders with a
much higher recidivism rate); Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender
Guideline, 2 CHARLOWE L. REV. 39 (2010).
24. Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 135.
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"disaster," a "mess," and "a cure worse than the disease. ' 25 Others
were more moderate,26 but very few found things to like.27 Some
who initially defended the system grew disillusioned as Congres-
sional micro-management undermined even those guidelines that
were developed by the Commission through research and impar-
tial deliberation. 28 The question for federal sentencing today,
therefore, is not whether the success of the mandatory guidelines
will be lost in an advisory system, but whether the mandatory sys-
tem's failures might be addressed while avoiding new and greater
problems.
The key to success will be replacing the pre-Booker standard for
departures from the guideline range with a framework that will
support the needed critical evaluation and evolution of the guide-
lines. Booker excised the statutory departure standard, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which had required judges to find an "ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
25. See generally, Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press 1998)
(1996) (summarizing criticism of the guidelines by judges and academic commentators and
noting that federal reform had proven a drag on the reform movement in the state courts);
Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guide-
lines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005); Judy Clarke, The Sentencing Guidelines: What a Mess, 55
FED. PROBATION 45 (1991); Gerald F. Uelman, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure
Worse than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899 (1992); American College of Trial Law-
yers, United States Sentencing Guidelines 2004: An Experiment That Has Failed (2004),
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All-Publications&Template=/CMlContentD
isplay.cfm&ContentFileID=58; Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart-
land: The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723
(1999); Erik Luna, CATO Institute, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentenc-
ing, Policy Analysis, No. 458 (2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf.
26. See General Accounting Office, Sentencing Guidelines: Central Questions Remain
Unanswered (1992), http://archive.gao.gov/d33t1O/147316.pdf; American Bar Association,
Justice Kennedy Commission, Reports With Recommendations to the ABA House of Dele-
gates at 35 (2004),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal-justice-section-newslett
er/crimjust kennedyJusticeKennedyCommissionReports.Final.authcheckdam.pdf (reject-
ing federal guidelines model, noting that it is the "most criticized of all commission-
guidance structures" and summarizing shortcomings); Kevin Reitz, Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, Report (American Law Institute 2003) (supporting sentencing guidelines but
summarizing criticisms of federal version; Kevin Reitz, American Law Institute, Model
Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525 (2002).
27. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Hon. Stewart
Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L. REV. 317 (1995).
28. Compare Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WiS. L. REV.
679, with Frank 0. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319-20 (2005).
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different than described" by the guidelines.2 9 Read in context, the
standard directs that a non-guideline sentence "should result"
whenever a judge finds that this would better serve the statutory
purposes. 30 One might have expected a vigorous jurisprudence to
develop under this standard, with judges evaluating the adequacy
of the Commission's consideration of a factor and testing the
guidelines against the statute. Such evaluation, similar in some
ways to the administrative law review courts apply to rulemaking
by other independent agencies, was expected at least by Justice
Breyer, 31 encouraged by academic commentators, 32 and initially
attempted by a few courts.33 But this never happened in the man-
datory system.
1. Heartland Failure
Instead, departure jurisprudence developed in a different, and
unhelpful, direction. It focused on the metaphor of the guidelines'
"heartland." The concept was introduced in passing in the original
Guidelines Manual and nowhere defined by the Commission. In
practice, multiple and conflicting "heartlands" soon developed and
were never reconciled.3 4 Cases falling outside the "heartland"
were often characterized as "extraordinary" or "unusual" and
thought to involve "atypical" circumstances. It was assumed that
sentencing judges would develop a sense of what types of cases
were typical under each guideline and recognize extra-ordinary
cases. And it was assumed that the guidelines worked well when
applied to typical cases falling under their literal terms.
None of these assumptions was justified. Most district judges
do not see enough civil rights, environmental, or tax cases to de-
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2010).
30. Id.
31. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 778 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Commission's actions are "subject, of course, to the kind of judicial supervision and
review that courts would undertake were the Commission a typical administrative agen-
cy.").
32. Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing
Reform Act, 3 FED. SENT'G REP. 235 (1991); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and
the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1 (1991); Joseph Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity Congress'" A Call for Meaningful
Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.R. 1199 (1999).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1991), vacated on rehear-
ing, 970 F.2d 1490 (1992); United States v, Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 1994).
34. See Paul J. Hofer, Discretion to Depart After Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SENT'G




velop a sense of what a "typical" case looks like.35 Many guide-
lines are applied so infrequently they may have no "heartland" at
all. Nor does the typical case necessarily remain constant over
time, as Department of Justice priorities and practices change.
Applying a guideline to whatever type of offender is frequently
brought under it allows prosecutors, rather than the Commission,
to define the meaning of the guideline and the appropriate penalty
for those offenders. The typical case may actually be different
from the type of case for which the guideline was written, resulting
in a complete disconnect between the theory or purpose of the
guideline and its application.
2. The Disconnect Between Guidelines and Purposes
There were many examples of this severe disconnect before
Booker, and it is remarkable how the departure mechanism failed
to correct for them. The Commission reported in 1997 that a sub-
stantial number of cases sentenced under the then-effective money
laundering guideline were run-of-the-mill fraud cases and not the
types of cases for which the guideline had been intended, i.e.,
"money laundering [activities] which are essential to the operation
of organized crime." 36 Application of the guideline to these fraud
offenders resulted in penalties grossly disproportionate to the se-
riousness of the offense. Yet the government opposed departure
as long as a case fell under the guideline's literal definitions, and
very few judges departed based on the obvious and documented
disconnect between the guideline's intended scope and its mechan-
ical application. 37
35. Frank 0. Bowman, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence After Koon, 9
FED. SENT'G REP. 19 (July/Aug. 1996)(demonstrating that the claim that district judges
have a better sense of the statistical norm is dubious).
36. United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), Sentencing Policy for Money Laun-
dering Offenses, including Comments on Department of Justice Report at 4 (Sept. 18, 1997),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and PublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony andReports
lMoney_.LauderingTopics/19970918 RtCMoneyLaundering.PDF.
37. For examples of these exceptions, see, e.g., United States v. Ferrouillet, 1997 WL
266627 (E. D. La. May 20, 1997) ("In examining whether a case falls outside of the heart-
land, a court should ask what type of case a particular guideline is intended to cover" using
legislative history, guideline commentary, and other material that can shed light on the
purpose of the guideline); United States v. Bart, 973 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (simi-
lar). An attempt by the Commission to amend the guidelines to correct for this problem
was rejected by Congress at the same time it rejected a proposed fix to the crack guidelines.
After lengthy negotiations with the Department of Justice, a compromise was reached that
partly corrected the disproportionality the Commission had identified. See USSC, Report to
Congress: Sentencing Policy for Money Laundering Crimes, including Comments on De-
partment of Justice Report (1997) available at
Vol. 49684
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The most common disconnect was, and sadly continues to be,
excessively long sentences for low-level drug trafficking offenders.
As described in Commission reports, 38 the legislative history sur-
rounding the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (hereinafter "ADAA")
shows that Congress believed ten-year minimum penalties were
appropriate for "kingpins," "masterminds," those "who are respon-
sible for creating and delivering very large quantities." 39 Five-
year minimum penalties were intended for "managers of the retail
traffic," [ ... I "the person who is filling the bags of heroin, packag-
ing crack cocaine into vials . and doing so in substantial street
quantities."
40
But as implemented by the Commission, the guidelines recom-
mend for many low-level drug offenders prison terms that are ap-
propriate only for managers or kingpins.41 The ADAA established
quantity thresholds for five and ten-year mandatory minimums
based on erroneous information suggesting that certain amounts
of drugs were commonly found with certain types of offenders.
42
http://www.ussc.govfLegislative andPublicAffairs/Congressional Testimony-and Reports
[MoneyLauderingTopics19970918_RtCMoneyLaundering.PDF; U.S.C. App. C, Amend.
634 (Nov. 1, 2001).




39. Id. at 119.
40. Id. at 120.
41. See USSC, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 28-30
(2007),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative-andPublicAffairs/Congressional-Testimony andReports
/DrugTopics/200705 RtCCocaineSentencingPolicy.pdf (showing large numbers of low-
level crack and powder cocaine offenders exposed to harsh penalties intended for more
serious offenders); id. at 28-29 (showing drug quantity not correlated with offender func-
tion); USSC, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 42-49 (2002),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimony-and-Reports
/DrugTopics/200205_RtC CocaineSentencingPolicy/200205_CocaineandFederal_Sente
ncingPolicy.pdf (showing drug mixture quantity fails to closely track important facets of
offense seriousness); Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 47-55 (2004) (discussing evi-
dence of numerous problems in operation of drug trafficking guidelines); Eric L. Sevigny,
Excessive Uniformity in Federal Drug Sentencing, 25 J. QUANT. CRIM. 155, 171 (2009) (drug
quantity "is not significantly correlated with role in the offense.").
42. Hearing on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws Before the H. Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Eric Sterling, President, The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation),
http://www.cjpf.org/crimemandmin6_26_07.pdf. In 1986, Mr. Sterling was subcommittee
counsel principally responsible for developing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
created the five and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. Specifically,
Mr. Sterling testified that:
The Subcommittee's approach in 1986 was to tie the punishment to the offenders'
role in the marketplace. A certain quantity of drugs was assigned to a category of
punishment because the Subcommittee believed that this quantity was easy to speci-
686 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 49
Moreover, the ADAA required that the weight of any "mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount 43 of a drug was to be
included, arbitrarily counting talc, or sugar, or other dilutants the
same as a drug. The Commission incorporated these erroneous
thresholds and weighing methods into sentencing guideline §
2D1.1 and, with little explanation, linked the quantities to offense
levels so that first time offenders with no aggravating factors re-
ceive recommended ranges falling entirely above the statutory
minimum, and expanded the two statutory thresholds into seven-
teen levels in its Drug Quantity Table, extrapolating below, be-
tween, and above them.
44
It soon became clear to both front-line practitioners and re-
searchers that the drug trafficking guideline often resulted in ex-
cessive guideline ranges for many offenders. 45 The General Ac-
counting Office reported that the drug trafficking guideline was
the most often-cited problem with the sentencing guidelines.
46
Judges chafed at the unfair penalties they were asked to impose
and the Judicial Conference of the United States criticized the
guideline's emphasis on drug quantity.47 However, despite the ob-
fy and prove and 'is based on the minimum quantity that might be controlled or di-
rected by a trafficker in a high place in the processing and distribution chain.'
[H.Rep't. 99-845, Part 1, Sept. 19, 1986, pp. 11-12] However, we made some huge
mistakes. First, the quantity triggers that we chose are wrong. They are much too
small. They bear no relation to actual quantities distributed by the major and high-
level traffickers and serious retail drug trafficking operations, the operations that
were intended by the subcommittee to be the focus of the federal effort. The second
mistake was including retail drug trafficking in the federal mandatory minimum
scheme at all.
Id. at 4-5.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2010).
44. Fifteen Year Review, supra note 13, at 48-52.
45. Special Issue: The Disproportionate Imprisonment of Low-Level Drug Offenders, 7
FED. SENT. REP. (1994); Miles Harer, Do Guideline Sentences for Low-Risk Drug Traffick-
ers Achieve Their Stated Purposes? 7 FED. SENT. REP. 22 (1994); Peter Reuter and Jona-
than Caulkins, Redefining the Goals of National Drug Policy: Recommendations from a
Working Group, 85 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1059, 1062 (1995) (RAND corporation working
group concludes "[flederal sentences for drug offenders are often too severe: they offend
justice, serve poorly as drug control measures, and are very expensive to carry out ... [t]he
U.S. Sentencing Commission should review its guidelines to allow more attention to the
gravity of the offense and not simply to the quantity of the drug."); Steven B. Wasserman,
Sentencing Guidelines: Toward Sentencing Reform for Drug Couriers, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
6443 (1995); Jane L. Froyd, Comment: Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471 (2000).
46. General Accounting Office, Sentencing Guidelines: Central Questions Remain Un-
answered at 155 (1992), http://archive.gao.gov/d33tlO/147316.pdf (harshness and inflexibil-
ity of drug guideline most frequent problem cited by interviewees; examples of unwarrant-
ed disparity attributed to guideline).
47. See Judicial Conference of the United States, 1995 Annual Report of the JCUS to
the U. S. Sentencing Commission at 2 (Mar. 1995) ("the Judicial Conference ... encourages
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vious disconnect between the guideline's recommendations and
the purposes of sentencing, judges routinely imposed unnecessari-
ly severe sentences because they felt bound to the literal terms of
the guideline
As these examples demonstrate, departure analysis in the pre-
Booker era failed to correct for errors and injustices that were mis-
takenly built into the guideline rules or that emerged in their day-
to-day operation. "Heartland" analysis diverted attention from
the purpose of the sentence to whether there was anything "ex-
traordinary" about the defendant. Sadly, and ironically, if a
guideline functioned so badly that most of the offenders falling
under its literal terms were subject to penalties far greater than
necessary to achieve any sentencing purpose, traditional depar-
ture analysis did not authorize a non-guideline sentence. The pre-
Booker jurisprudence of departures clearly failed to provide the
mechanism needed for critical evaluation and constructive evolu-
tion of the guidelines.
48
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL SENTENCING
Booker was widely interpreted as granting sentencing judges
greater "discretion." But this generality offers no guidance on how
sentencing procedures and criteria should change to give sub-
stance to Booker's remedy while avoiding the "discordant sympho-
ny"49 predicted by its critics. Much of the substance is found in
the court's subsequent decisions, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338 (2007), Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), Spears v. United States, 555
U.S. 261 (2009), Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350 (2009), and
most recently United States v. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). In
these cases the Court made clear that the guidelines are the start-
ing point for sentencing, but they are not to be presumed reasona-
ble and judges must evaluate the guideline recommendation inde-
the Commission to study the wisdom of drug sentencing guidelines which are driven virtu-
ally exclusively by the quantity or weight of the drugs involved.").
48. For additional discussion of the failures of pre-Booker departure jurisprudence, see
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heartland: The Long Search for Admin-
istrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723 (1999); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing
Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences,
91 Nw. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (1997); Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of
Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 93 (1999).
49. Booker, 543 U.S. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pendently in light of all of the § 3553(a) factors. Judges may reject
unsound guidelines and policy statements, even in ordinary or
typical cases, and substitute better policies of their own determi-
nation. To determine whether a guideline recommendation com-
plies with the statute, judges can examine the method by which
the guideline was developed, the rationale offered by the Commis-
sion for how the recommendation complies with the statute (if
any), and a wide range of evidence on the fairness and effective-
ness of a guideline for achieving the purposes of sentencing.
A. Consideration of the Guideline Recommendation
Booker made 18 U.S.C. § 3553 the central framework for sen-
tencing, so one approach would be to take up the seven factors in
the statute in the order they are listed. This would highlight 1)
"the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant," 2) the purposes to be served by
the sentence, and 3) the kinds of sentencing options available by
statute.50 But this is not how the law has developed. The Sen-
tencing Commission began training judges and probation officers
just days after Booker in how to proceed in the advisory guidelines
era. 51 The Commission proposed making the fourth statutory fac-
tor, "the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range" established
by the Commission, the first step of post-Booker sentencing. This
"guidelines first" approach was adopted by many courts,5 2 and in
Gall a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that "a district court
should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating
the applicable Guidelines range. . . . As a matter of administra-
tion and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should
be the starting point and the initial benchmark."
53
Beginning with the guideline calculation has some practical
benefit; it assures that some of the fact-finding required to estab-
lish the procedural reasonableness of a sentence is completed be-
fore moving on to other considerations. Giving temporal priority
to the guideline calculation comes at a cost, however. 54 While the
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
51. USSC, Commonly Asked Questions Regarding Federal Sentencing Following United
States v. Booker (Feb. 2005) (on file with authors).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing
three-step process); United States v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 865-66 (8th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
53. Gall, 552 U.S. at 48 (internal citations omitted).
54. For additional discussion of problems with starting with the guidelines, see Jelani
Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Fed-
688 Vol. 49
Beyond the Heartland
Court made clear that a sentencing judge "may not presume that
the Guidelines range is reasonable,"55 both its primacy and its ap-
parent precision increase the "gravitational pull" of the guidelines
recommendation.5 6 The recommendation results from an often-
complicated mathematical process and is expressed as a range of
months. Regardless of how arbitrary or unreliable are the factors
determining that range, it can appear to provide a more objective
standard for evaluating a sentence than the general statutory fac-
tors. Moreover, the guidelines' recommendation serves as a psy-
chological "anchor," which appears to simplify or obviate the
daunting task of evaluating the seriousness of the offense, the
dangerousness of the offender, and other considerations relevant
to the statutory purposes.57 It is no surprise that judges would be
grateful for a recommendation that purports to take into account
the difficult considerations that bear on sentencing.
The Commission and some judges sought to increase the inher-
ent attraction of the guidelines recommendation by further in-
creasing its gravitational pull. They argued that the guidelines as
a whole were carefully developed to recommend sentences that
comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that their recommendations
deserve "heavy"58 or "substantial"59 "weight." (Other judges coun-
eral Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and the New
Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U.L. REV. 115 (2008).
55. Gall, 553 U.S. at 48-9; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 338.
56. The gravitational pull of the guidelines' recommendation was also reflected in the
Court's suggestion that "a major departure should be supported by a more significant justi-
fication than a minor one" even as it rejected any requirement of "extraordinary justifica-
tion" for sentences that are mathematically more distant from the guideline range. Gall,
553 U.S. at 50.
57. See Hon. Nancy Gertner, Blackmun Lecture at the Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law Barrister Club, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing (Sept. 27, 2006), in 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 529 (2007); Hon. Nancy Gertner,
What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 127
(2006) ("Anchoring is a strategy used to simplify complex tasks, in which numeric judg-
ments are assimilated to a previously considered standard. When asked to make a judg-
ment, decision-makers take an initial starting value (i.e., the anchor) and then adjust it up
or down. Studies underscore the significance of that initial anchor; judgments tend to be
strongly biased in its direction.'), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/07/gertner.html (quo-
tations omitted); Panel Discussion, Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory Guidelines" Ob-
servations by District Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2006) (Judge Lynch describing
research on "anchoring." "Whether people like that number or not, even if they are angry
about that number, does not matter; they will still be influenced by that number. That is
the psychological fact. I think it is psychologically inevitable that the Guidelines will have
a powerful influence on sentences, even if they are purely advisory.").
58. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 925 (D. Utah 2005).
59. Prepared Testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Coin-
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tered that they deserve only "some weight.").60 This early issue of
post-Booker sentencing turned away from the question: "How well
does the recommendation comply with the statutory factors?," and
substituted: "How mandatorily should the guidelines still be
treated?" Analysis focused on the proper degree of judicial "discre-
tion" rather than the reasonableness of the guidelines' recommen-
dations. 6
1
The Supreme Court's actual reasoning in the post-Booker cases
reveals, however, that the debate over "weight" was far too sim-
plistic. It is impossible to state a general rule about how much
"weight," or deference, or respect judges should give to all guide-
lines' recommendations; it all depends on the particular guideline
in question. The Court repeatedly linked the respect due a rec-
ommendation to the evidence of its connection to § 3553(a), as re-
flected in the method of the guideline's development, the data on
which it was based, research on its fairness and effectiveness, and
the quality of the Commission's explanations for the policies un-
derlying the recommendation. These decisions make clear that the
guidelines should not be given some overall "weight;" they should
be given individualized scrutiny.
B. Why Some Guidelines may be Worth Following
The Supreme Court clearly addressed why or why not sentenc-
ing judges might find the guidelines recommendation worth fol-
lowing. It noted that the Commission was charged in the SRA
with a task similar, but not identical, to that of sentencing judg-
es-recommending sentences that achieve the purposes of sen-
tencing.62 Thus, when the Commission uses the procedures in the
SRA to carefully design a guideline-that is, when it acts in its
mittee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 10, 2005), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/sccaseslbookertestimony.pdf (last viewed May 17, 2008).
60. Douglas Berman, "The weighty guidelines question after Gall," Sentencing Law, &
Policy, Dec. 11, 2007, available at
http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencing-law-and-policy/2007/12/the-weighty-gui.html
(last viewed May 17, 2008).
61. For a discussion of the various meanings of judicial discretion in the post-Booker
environment, see Paul J. Hofer, Immediate and Long-Term Effects of United States v.
Booker: More Discretion, More Disparity, or Better Reasoned Sentences? 38 ARIZ. S. L. REV.
425 (2006).
62. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), (t), (m). One notable distinction between the Commission's
task and that of sentencing judges is that the Commission is not explicitly required to




"characteristic institutional role"63 as an independent expert agen-
cy-it is "fair to assume" that the guidelines reflect a "rough ap-
proximation" of sentences that "might achieve 3553(a) objectives,"
at least in the ordinary case.64 But conversely, if a guideline was
not developed in this manner, there is no reason to think its rec-
ommendation represents any institutional expertise greater than
that of the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge, after all, also
has the advantages of knowing the particular facts of the case and
the individual characteristics of the defendant better than any
rule-maker in Washington, D.C.
Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall all rely on this rationale for when
the guidelines deserve respect and when they do not. In Rita, the
Court held that appellate courts may (but are not required) to pre-
sume a within-guideline sentence reasonable, because theoretical-
ly, such sentences should reflect both the sentencing judge's and
the Commission's determination that a sentence within the range
complies with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Justice Breyer's description of
how the guidelines were developed, like those he gave when he
was a Commissioner, accentuates the reasoned processes of the
SRA and ignores or minimizes the many times those processes
were subverted or ignored. 65
In Kimbrough, the court acknowledged that the Commission
"has the capacity courts lack to 'base its determinations on empiri-
cal data and national experience, guided by a professional staff
with appropriate expertise."' 66 However, some guidelines "do not
exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institu-
tional role."67 When a guideline is not the product of "empirical
data and national experience," it is not an abuse of discretion to
63. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
64. Rita, 551 U.S. at 348-49.
65. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1988). The account in this article mirrors
the one in the original introduction to the Guidelines Manual. Both emphasize the Com-
mission's study of data on past practice as well as compromises among competing views,
but say little or nothing about how mandatory minimum statutes or specific directives from
Congress affected the Commission's deliberations. This difference between theory and
actual practice led one former Commissioner to remark, "the methodology described in the
original introduction less aptly reflects most of the current guidelines than the U.S. Su-
preme Court seems to realize. The proliferation of Congressional directives and other statu-
tory changes, and the Commission's implementation of both, along with some important
Commission initiatives along the way have changed sentences for many offenses substan-
tially from the averages of pre-guideline practice." An Interview with John R. Steer, Former
Vice Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 32 The Champion 40, 42 (2008).
66. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (internal citations omitted).
67. Id. at 109.
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conclude that it fails to achieve the § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in "a
mine-run case."68 In Gall, Justice Stevens repeats Rita's descrip-
tion (the guidelines are "the product of careful study based on ex-
tensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of
individual sentencing decisions" 69) but goes on to add an im-
portant caveat: "Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this
empirical evidence. For example, the Sentencing Commission de-
parted from the empirical approach when setting the Guideline
range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to
the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress estab-
lished for such crimes."
70
This analysis of the pedigrees of different guidelines-not a
blanket declaration that all guidelines deserve equal respect-is
at the heart of the Supreme Court's post-Booker cases. It is the
only approach consistent with judges' duties under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) and with Booker's rationale for why judges will find some,
but not all, guidelines worth following.
C. New Reasons for Sentencing Outside the Range
The Court's reasoning in the post-Booker cases requires recogni-
tion of many new types of reasons for sentencing outside the
guidelines range. In Rita, Justice Breyer outlined several types of
arguments for such sentences that judges must consider. A party
may argue that "the case at hand falls outside the 'heartland' to
which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply."
71
Unlike the mandatory era, parties may argue that the guideline
was not intended to apply to cases like the present one, even if it
is statistically typical or ordinary. Parties may argue that the
guidelines "do not generally treat certain defendant characteris-
tics in the proper way" 72 or neglect or do not properly treat certain
circumstances of the offense or offender. 73 If the government ar-
gues that a particular restriction on consideration of an offender
68. Id. at 109 (citations omitted),
69. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
70. Id.
71. Rita, 551 U.S. at 344. Note that this description of the heartland as cases "to which
the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply" (emphasis supplied) differs from
the common understanding of "heartland" in the mandatory era. If taken seriously, this
clarification could help avoid some problems of pre-Booker jurisprudence, which commonly
conceived of the heartland as statistically common or "ordinary" cases.
72. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357.
73. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1242-43; Gall, 552 U.S. at 59; Rita, 552 U.S. at 357.
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characteristic contained in the Commission's policy statements
prevents such consideration, the court may find that that re-
striction is unsound, as the Supreme Court held in Pepper.
Alternatively, a party can argue that a non-guidelines sentence
is appropriate, even in a typical case to which the guideline was
intended to apply and even in the absence of particular mitigating
factors, "because the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to
reflect the § 3553(a) considerations," and thus "reflect[s] an un-
sound judgment. '74 The Court invites advocates to demonstrate
that a particular guideline is generally ineffective or dispropor-
tionate in a wide range, or even the majority, of cases subject to it.
The Court makes clear that judges may consider a wide variety of
evidence to make this determination. In an important passage,
Justice Breyer notes that the presumption of reasonableness of
within-range sentences that appellate courts are permitted to
make is not the type that "leads appeals courts to grant greater
fact-finding leeway to an expert agency than to a district judge.."
75
When deciding if a guideline recommendation complies with the
statute, courts can hear evidence of the type the Commission itself
might use in developing, evaluating, or amending a guideline, in-
cluding research on the relationship between the guideline and
the purposes of sentencing.
The Court itself discussed this kind of empirical evidence in
Kimbrough: "Itihe 100-to-1 ratio rested on assumptions about 'the
relative harmfulness of the two drugs and the relative prevalence
of certain harmful conduct associated with their use and distribu-
tion that more recent research and data no longer support. . . [em-
phasis supplied]... The Commission furthermore noted that 'the
epidemic of crack cocaine use by youth never materialized to the
extent feared.' . . . the crack/powder disparity is inconsistent with
the 1986 Act's goal of punishing major drug traffickers more se-
verely than low-level dealers.."76  In Pepper, where amicus ap-
pointed by the Court to defend the decision below to prohibit con-
sideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation argued that the deci-
sion could be upheld based on a Commission policy statement pro-
hibiting such consideration and mirroring circuit law, Justice So-
74. Rita at 357. Justice Breyer adds, somewhat mysteriously, that courts might also
find that a non-guideline sentence may be appropriate "regardless." Id. at 357. This may
have been added to assure other justices that no judicial fact finding was necessary for
judges to sentence outside the range, which was a crucial aspect of the remedy's solution to
the Sixth Amendment problem identified in the merits opinion.
75. Id. at 347.
76. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 86 (internal citation omitted).
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tomayor reviewed the Commission's explanations for this policy
statement and found that "the Commission's views rest on wholly
unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing
statutes Congress enacted."
77
These critical analyses of the pedigree of each guideline refocus-
es attention from the facts of the case to the support for the guide-
line, that is, to the research and stated rationale on which any
given guideline is based. This turn away from traditional "heart-
land" analysis is the key to Booker's potential.
III. OBSTACLES TO EVOLUTION OF THE GUIDELINES
After Booker, many judges used their increased sentencing au-
thority to take greater account of offense and offender characteris-
tics that were deemed irrelevant or off-limits under the mandatory
system.78 The Commission has begun to respond to this judicial
feedback by softening some of the unnecessary restrictions in its
policy statements, which had ruled many of these characteristics
"not ordinarily relevant" and others prohibited altogether.79 Some
judges have turned a critical eye to particular guidelines and im-
posed sentences outside the recommended range, even in "heart-
land" or "mine-run" cases.80 After Kimbrough made clear that
judges can indeed reject guideline recommendations even if based
on Congressional policies, Congress amended one of the worst of
these-the 100-to-1 quantity ratio between powder and crack co-
caine-which led to amendment of the corresponding guideline to
reduce penalties for most crack offenders.81
But despite this progress, significant problems and questions
remain. Some advocates and sentencing judges continue to de-
77. Pepper, 131 S.Ct. at 1247.
78. Paul J. Hofer, Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using Empirical Research to Inform
the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 433 (2007).
79. USSC, Guidelines Manual Appendix C, Amendment 739.
80. For example, the guideline for possession or distribution of child pornography has
come under particular scrutiny. See United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010)
(upholding variance from § 2G2.2 as procedurally reasonable); United States v. Dorvee, 616
F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing guideline sentence under § 2G2.2 as substantively un-
reasonable); United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing guideline sen-
tence under § 2G2.2 because district court erred in holding that it did not have the authori-
ty to impose a non-guideline sentence based on policy considerations); United States v.
Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing below-guideline sentence in child pornog-
raphy case as procedurally unreasonable and unreasonably harsh).
81. USSC, Supplement to the 2010 Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1, 2010) (containing guide-
line amendment pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220. This
amendment has been re-promulgated as a proposed permanent amendment, and will be
effective Nov. 1 2011 if Congress does not disapprove it.
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scribe sentencing in terms nearly indistinguishable from pre-
Booker practice-calculation of the guidelines followed by a search
for anything "unusual" or "atypical" about an offense or defendant
that might take the case out of the "heartland" and justify a sen-
tence outside the guidelines range.8 2 Entrenched concepts and
habits have locked some courts into an approach to sentencing
that remains disconnected from the statutory purposes. And de-
spite clear authority to reject unsound guidelines on policy
grounds, some judges remain reluctant to do so.
The best example of judges' reluctance to embrace their new au-
thority may be sentencing under the guideline for crack cocaine in
the years after Booker but prior to the recent amendment. It was
well known that the Commission itself had repeatedly shown that
the assumptions on which the guideline was based were false, that
the guideline recommended terms of imprisonment that were un-
justifiably harsh, and that this unfairness fell largely on African-
American defendants.8 3 In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court ap-
provingly reviewed this and other evidence to conclude that judges
could reasonably reject the guideline recommendation even in or-
dinary cases.8 4 In Spears, the court reiterated that judges could
reject the policy categorically and substitute a better one.8 5 Even
the Attorney General stated that the guideline was unfair and
that the disparity should be eliminated.
Yet in fiscal year 2009, which fell completely after the decision
in Kimbrough, 42.9% of crack defendants continued to be sen-
tenced within or above the guidelines recommended range, even in
cases where no trumping mandatory minimum penalty required
such an excessive penalty.86 Moreover, no appellate court ever
82. The present author has heard judges report that after Booker they "look to see if
there is anything unusual about a case that might justify a departure." The Department of
Justice's most recent guidance on charging and plea bargaining echoes similar language,
saying that prosecutors should generally argue for a sentence within the guideline range
"[i]n the typical case." Eric H. Holder, Memorandum to All Federal Prosecutors, May 19,
2010, at 2.
83. USSC, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy
(1995); USSC, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (2002); USSC,
Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (2007).
84. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 94 (citing Commission report finding that the effects of pre-
natal exposure to cocaine were not as harmful as believed with the 100:1 powder to crack
quantity ratio was developed, and anomalous result of retail crack dealers getting longer
sentences than their wholesale powder cocaine suppliers).
85. Spears, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
86. USSC FY2009 Monitoring Dataset (analyses conducted by the author). This dataset




held that the crack guideline recommendation was categorically
unreasonable in the ordinary cases to which it applied, even
though by 2009 no one was arguing that the guideline was rea-
sonable.87 Did the judges in these cases believe, contrary to the
considerable evidence documented by the Commission, that the
recommended sentence was fair? On what did they base this con-
clusion? Or, as seems more likely, did they continue to believe
that the guideline, for some reason, deserved deference from judg-
es?
All of this raises questions about what is hindering development
of a robust post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence that could identi-
fy guidelines that are disconnected from the purposes of sentenc-
ing and contribute to meaningful evolution of the system.
A. The Commission's Recalcitrance
Part of the problem has been the Commission's attempts to
maintain the language and procedures of the mandatory era,
while stigmatizing the exercise of judges' new powers as "outside
the system." For almost four years, the Guidelines Manual did
not mention Booker or subsequent cases at all. Policy statement §
5K2.0, which identifies grounds for departure, continues to this
day to mirror the language of the statutory standard that was ex-
cised by Booker ("there exists an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance, of a kind or to a degree, not adequately considered by
the Sentencing Commission"). When mention was finally made of
Booker and later decisions in 2008, the Commission emphasized
the parts that underscored the "continuing importance" of the
guidelines and remained silent on how judges might identify un-
sound recommendations, provide feedback to the Commission, and
improve the sentences they impose.88 In 2010, the Commission
admonished judges that mitigating offender characteristics should
not be given "excessive weight" and that their "most appropriate
use" is "not as a reason to sentence outside the applicable guide-
line range," but to determine the sentence within the guideline
range. Rather than embrace judges' new powers to critically eval-
87. See e.g, United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
district court does not "acts unreasonably, abuses its discretion, or otherwise commit error
if it does not consider the crack/powder sentencing disparity"); United States v. Burks, 377
Fed. Appx. 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2010).
88. U.S.C, App. C. Amend. 717 (Nov. 1, 2008).
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uate guidelines as an engine of feedback and constructive change,
the Commission attempted to stifle it.
1. Departures" and "Variances"
As discussed in Part II, the Commission began to train judges
and probation officers soon after Booker to begin the sentencing
process with calculation of the guideline range. This step was
then followed by two others, which the Commission has recently
incorporated into the Guidelines Manual at § 1B1.1 (Application
Instructions) as follows:
(a) The court shall determine the kinds of sentence and the
guideline range as set forth in the guidelines ... ";
(b) "The court shall then consider Parts H and K of Chapter
Five, Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures, and
any other policy statements or commentary in the guidelines
that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence"; and
(c) "The court shall then consider the applicable factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) taken as a whole."
Background commentary was also added stating that, "[i]f, after
step (c), the court imposes a sentence that is outside the guidelines
framework, such a sentence is considered a 'variance."' This
amendment thus attempted to formalize a distinction between
"departures" and "variances" that has dominated, and confused,
jurisprudence in the advisory guideline era.8 9
Prior to the amendment, most courts used the term "variance"
and distinguished it from "departure," but one circuit said that the
departure concept was "obsolete."90  After initially ignoring the
distinction,91 the Supreme Court in Irizarry v. United States 92 ap-
plied it, divorced from its initial function, with the effect of nar-
89. See Paul J. Hofer, How Well Do Sentencing Commission Statistics Help in Under-
standing the Post-Booker System? 22 FED. SENT.'G REP. 89 (2010) for examples of how the
distinction has confused data collection and interpretation.
90. See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Toliver, 183 Fed.
Appx. 745, 747 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Our circuit still uses 'departure' terminology in cer-
tain circumstances, but not with the same vitality and force that it had pre-Booker.").
91. Justice Breyer wrote in Rita that a judge "may depart" either "pursuant to the
Guidelines" or by imposing a "non-Guidelines sentence" pursuant to Booker. Rita, 551 U.S.
at 350. Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Gall used the terms interchangeably. Gall, 552
U.S. at 46, 51.
92. 553 U.S.708 (2008).
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rowing procedural rights.9 3 The distinction has misled many
commentators to think of departures or variances as types of sen-
tences, rather than categories of reasons, even though many sen-
tences are based on a combination of reasons from both catego-
ries.94
Judges and advocates disagree on the wisdom and necessity of
engaging in a departure analysis at step two distinct from a vari-
ance analysis at step three. Practice appears to vary from court to
court.95 Some advocates have likened the second and third steps
to "two bites at the apple;" if a judge is not convinced at step two
to depart based on a particular circumstance, an argument can be
made at step three for a variance based on that circumstance.
Those defense attorneys who favor a separate departure step be-
lieve it is easier to convince some judges to depart than to vary, at
least when their clients clearly fall under a policy statement or
commentary encouraging departure in the Guidelines Manual.
Judges who favor a separate departure step appear to believe that
departures are more acceptable than variances to Congress, or to
the appellate courts, as well as to the Commission.
93. In Irizarry a 5-4 majority held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h), written prior to Booker
to give parties notice of a court's intention to "depart" from the guidelines, did not extend to
"variances." Justice Stevens termed "departure" a "term of art" that "refers only to non-
Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines." Irizarry,
553 U.S. at 714. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued that departure/variance was a
distinction without much of a difference. He noted that the reasons justifying a "departure"
had always been open-ended and included factors unmentioned in the Guidelines Manual.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B). Moreover, the purpose of requiring notice-to ensure adver-
sarial testing of matters relating to the sentence-applied with equal force to both "vari-
ances" and "departures." See also Melissa Healy, A Continuing Right to Notice: Why Irizar-
ry v. United States Should Not Be the Last Word for District Courts Imposing Post -Booker
Variance Sentences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1147 (2008).
Irizarry effectively narrowed the scope of the right to notice, because the definition of "de-
parture" shifted after Booker. Prior to the decision in FY2005, 5.0 percent of sentences
were upward (0.7%) or downward departures not sponsored by the government (4.3%). U.S.
Sent'g Comm., Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics (2005), Tbls 26, 26A. In the
most recent quarter, the percentage of departures is 2.8 percent (0.4% above and 2.4%
below). U.S. Sent'g Comm , Preliminary Quarterly Data Report, First Quarter FY2011
(available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data and Statistics/FederalSentencing-Statistics/Quarterly-Sentenc
ingUpdatesfUSSC_2011-lstQuarterReport.pdf ). Some cases called "departures" prior
to Booker are being classified as "variances" by judges and the Commission today.
94. See Supplement to the 2010 Guidelines Manual, supra note at 83, for a detailed
discussion of the confusion and complexities involved in categorizing sentences using this
distinction.
95. Panel on Departures and Variances, National Seminar on the Sentencing Guide-
lines, St. Petersburg Florida, May 13, 2010. The author was a participant on the panel
with judges and sentencing advocates from around the country.
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Congress's concerns, however, have historically centered on the
sheer rate of below-range sentences, even when all were called
departures, and it is far from clear that the distinction between
departures and variances will matter to Congress. Defense attor-
neys who are skeptical of a separate departure step have noted
that commentary in the guidelines usually encourages upward
departures, 96 and only rarely encourages downward departures. 97
Moreover, the commentary and policy statements that authorize
downward departures often limit the circumstances in which they
apply and the extent of reduction that is permissible. 98 Encourag-
ing judges to consider them needlessly risks invoking these and
other limitations from pre-Booker case law.99 The three-step anal-
ysis also risks fruitlessly prolonging sentencing hearings and gen-
erating pointless appeals. It is hard to see the advantage of con-
sidering a circumstance within the unexplained strictures of the
commentary and policy statements governing "departures," only to
revisit the same factor at step three, under the rubric of "vari-
ance," free from those strictures.100
At this point, it seems reasonable to ask whether the depar-
ture/variance distinction and the Commission's three-step proce-
dure have proven informative and productive or whether they
have gotten post-Booker jurisprudence off on the wrong foot. Ra-
ther than starting anew with the purposes of sentencing, there is
96. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2A2.4 (Obstructing or Impeding Officers), comment. (n. 3) ('The
base offense level does not assume any significant disruption of government functions. In
[such cases] an upward departure may be warranted.").
97. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2N2.1 (Food and Drug Regulatory Violations), comment. (n. 1)
('This guideline assumes a regulatory offense that involved knowing or reckless conduct.
Where only negligence was involved, a downward departure may be warranted.").
98. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 5H1.6, p.s. (Family Ties and Responsibilities) (limiting applica-
bility of departure and requiring, e.g., "substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential
caretaking or essential financial support"); § 5H1.20, p.s. (Aberrant Behavior) (precluding
departure in cases of, e.g., a "serious drug trafficking offense.").
99. Lee D. Heckman, The Benefits of Departure Obsolescence: Achieving the Purposes of
Sentencing in the Post-Booker World, 69 OHIO ST. L J. 149 (2008) (pre-Booker case law on
departures largely failed to address § 3553(a)).
100. See, e.g., United States v. E1-Homsi, No. 06-5213, 2008 WL 747595 (3d Cir. Mar. 21,
2008) (district court rejected a "variance" in language indicating it was applying the depar-
ture standard for diminished capacity under USSG § 5K2.13, leading the defendant to
argue on appeal that the judge erred at "step three" by allowing the departure standard to
limit his discretion under § 3553(a), to which the court of appeals responded that the judge
clearly understood the distinction); United States v. Akers, 261 Fed. Appx. 110 (10th Cir.
2008) (analyzing refusal to impose below-guideline sentence under the departure standard,
then under § 3553(a)). Some appellate judges have encouraged sentencing judges to simply
state at the end of their departure analysis that they would impose the same sentence
under § 3553(a), essentially collapsing the two steps.
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danger that litigation could again bog down parsing the meaning
of "variance," "heartland," and other concepts carried over from
the mandatory era. Even worse, the three-step framework sug-
gests that sentencing judges should consider the purposes of sen-
tencing only after the Guidelines Manual has been consulted,
when in fact the guidelines, policy statements, and commentary
cannot be presumed reasonable and must all be assessed in light
of the statute. Doing otherwise continues to treat the guidelines
as a series of diktats divorced from any account of what they are
trying to accomplish and how they aim to accomplish it.
2. Feedback Failure
Another obstacle to evolution of the system is the failure to de-
velop a robust mechanism for feedback about problems with the
guidelines. Under the SRA, judges have always been required to
give reasons for their sentences, which were then subject to appel-
late review. As described in Part II, Booker and its progeny ex-
panded the types of reasons that can justify sentences outside the
guideline range. A challenge for post-Booker sentencing is to find
a way to document and learn from this rich and informative pro-
liferation of reasons. 10 1 Written sentencing opinions from District
Court judges, although more frequent than under the mandatory
guidelines, remain too rare to provide robust feedback. 10 2 Expla-
nations for sentences announced at the sentencing hearing are not
necessarily turned into transcripts. Even when they are, they are
not necessarily sent to the Commission. And even when they are
sent to the Commission, the Commission does not review them.
The principal mechanism for reporting reasons for a sentence is
the Statement of Reasons form developed by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States working with the Commission, which
was revised shortly after Booker.'0 3 Unfortunately, the revision
has discouraged rather than captured specific feedback about
problems with the guidelines. To match the different kinds of rea-
101. For a discussion of how the law has developed to discourage judges from offering
careful explanations of their sentences, see Michael M. O'Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2009).
102. The need for more detailed explanations of the reasons for sentences is discussed in
Steven L Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. 146 (Supp. 2006).
103. A copy of the form can be found in Appendix A of the Commission's report on Book-
er, USSC, Final Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing





sons for sentences outside the guideline range outlined in Rita,
Gall, Kimbrough and Pepper, the new form should provide ways
for judges to convey: 1) facts about the offense or offender that are
relevant to the purposes of sentencing and justify a sentence out-
side the guidelines range, 2) problems with the guidelines that
make the recommended range excessive or otherwise out of line
with the statutory purposes, 3) policies that the judge finds un-
sound. Instead, the new form adds a page for reporting a "Court
Determination for Sentence Outside the Advisory Guideline Sys-
tem" that provides checkmarks that track the broad provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
This revision was intended to ease judges' reporting require-
ments, but it also discouraged collection of more detailed explana-
tions of the reasons for a sentence. It is hard to see what useful
can be learned from a judge simply checking a box indicating that
the sentence was imposed "to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense" or "to protect the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant."10 4 Indeed, these are the purposes that the statute requires
judges to consider in every case; singling out one or more says lit-
tle about why the judge found the guideline recommendation out
of line with the statute in that particular case. Although the form
provides space for judges to write in more detailed explanations,
this is labeled as only for "facts justifying a sentence outside the
advisory guideline range" and does not include problems with the
guidelines or the unsound policies on which they are based. The
revised SOR has simply not provided the robust feedback needed
to identify and quantify specific problems with the guidelines. 10 5
Other methods for identifying problematic guidelines are either
very coarse or are problematic in other ways. The Commission has
conducted surveys of judges, which is helpful for identifying gen-
eral problem areas but not for specifying exactly how guidelines go
104. For a detailed description of this and other problems with the Commission's data
collection, see generally, Hofer, supra note 80.
105. Empirical evidence of this feedback failure is found in the area of crack cocaine
sentencing. The Commission developed categories for the reasons indicated by judges.
Most of these categories track guideline provisions concerning departures ("4A1.3 Pending
Cases"), are very general ("Local conditions"), or simply punt ("As stated on the record.").
Only a few identify particular problems with the guidelines. One that did, however, was
"cracklpowder/cocaine disparity," which identified the well-known problem with the crack
guideline. In FY2008, however, a year when many judges were sentencing below the range
in light of this disparity, Commission data identified "cracklpowder/cocaine disparity" as a
reason for a below-range sentence in just sixty-three cases-a clear underestimate of the
extent to which this guideline was viewed as problematic. For a complete list of the catego-
ries of reasons, see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Variable Codebook for Individual Offend-
ers (revised Apr. 30, 2009) available from the Commission and on file with the author.
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wrong. 106 The sheer rate of sentences outside the guideline range
is often used as a rough proxy. But this is influenced by other fac-
tors, such as the number of adjustments the guideline takes into
account or the portion of cases brought under a guideline to which
it was never intended to apply. The best vehicle for feedback re-
mains thoughtful sentencing opinions, but this fails to represent
either the full caseload or the opinions of the judiciary as a whole.
B. The Commission, Congress, and Judicial Action Under §
3553(a)
Finally, some judges appear reluctant to critically evaluate the
guidelines because of two contradictory convictions. The first is
that the guidelines deserve respect because they represent the
considered judgment of the Commission acting in its capacity as
an independent expert agency. The Commission has done much to
encourage this conviction, but as discussed in Part I, it is not an
accurate description of how most guidelines were developed. The
second conviction is that the guidelines deserve respect because
they represent the policy choices of Congress to which judges are
institutionally, if not legally, bound to defer. The Commission has
also encouraged this conviction, even though it contradicts the
first. Neither conviction should prevent judges from critically
evaluating and rejecting unsound guidelines recommendations.
1. Should the Guidelines be Followed Because they Repre-
sent Congressional Policies?
In the same amicus brief in which the Commission argued that
it designed the guidelines using a "deliberative administrative
process," the Commission makes clear that the chief reason it be-
lieves the guidelines should be followed is that they reflect the will
of Congress. 10 7 This reasoning attempts to make an asset of the
fact that many guidelines reflect the influence of Congress and the
Department of Justice, expressed through mandatory minimums,
statutory directives, or sheer political pressure.108 The Commis-
106. USSC, Results of Survey of United States District Judges January 2010 through
March 2010 (June 2010).
107. USSC, Report to Congress, supra note 39 at 18, 20, 27, 28, 30.
108. For an informative account of how the Department and its allies in Congress have
pressured the Commission to create sentencing rules that are not based on empirical evi-
dence or experience, see Frank 0. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315 (2005).
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sion argued that judges should presume, ipse dixit, that guidelines
based on Congressional judgments comply with § 3553(a) because
Congress cannot act contrary to its own statute. Moreover, the
Commission argued that all guidelines could be presumed to in-
corporate the § 3553(a) factors because the guidelines are re-
viewed by Congress and, if not disapproved, can be presumed to
comply with the statute. Followed to its logical conclusion, this
reasoning suggests judges should never impose a non-guidelines
sentence because they disagree with an unsound policy, since the
guidelines must be presumed to incorporate all of the statutory
factors in the manner Congress wants, which judges are bound to
respect. This would make the guidelines more mandatory than
before Booker, however, and thus clearly unconstitutional.
Whatever merit such an argument may have had, Kimbrough v.
United States'°9 demonstrates that a judge can reject a guideline
sentence because it reflects an unsound policy, even if Congress
initially made the policy. And the Court's holding is not limited to
crack; many other guidelines share a similar pedigree, and similar
infirmities, as did the crack guideline. 110 A Congressional pedi-
gree cannot end the judicial inquiry as to whether a guideline rec-
ommendation is fair and effective.
Congress can legislate statutory minimums and maximums,"'
and those outer limits bind judges and trump any inconsistent
guideline range." 2 Congress can enact specific directives, which
bind the Commission to writing guidelines that conform, even if
the Commission itself believes the directive does not comply with
18 U.S.C. 3553(a). 113 But these directives to the Commission do
109. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
110. See Amy Baron-Evans & Jennifer Coffin, Judges are free to disagree with any guide-
line, not just crack, including guidelines, that are the product of congressional directives to
the Commission (Nov. 9, 2010) available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf-lib?Free%20to%2ODisagree%20with%2OAny%2OGuideline.pdf.
111. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (observing that "as concerns
the federal powers, defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative, not judicial, func-
tions"); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916) (stating that "the authority to
define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative," while the "right ... to impose the
punishment provided by law, is judicial"); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820)
("It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punish-
ment."); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ('CThe legislative authority of the
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that
shall have jurisdiction of the offence.").
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 5G1.1. Mandatory minimum penalties do not bind the Commission,
although it has often acted as if they do. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102-05; Neal v. Unit-
ed States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
113. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) (invalidating as inconsistent with
an unambiguous statutory directive part of the career offender guideline, which the Coin-
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not bind judges. 114 When Congress uses the Commission as a con-
duit for a specific sentence or sentencing increase, the resulting
guideline is but one factor to be considered under § 3553(a), and is
subject to the same critical analysis as other guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The guidelines, as originally envisioned in the SRA, were sup-
posed to be the product of a reasoned deliberative process by an
independent expert agency in the judicial branch.11 5 But often
they are not. By arguing that the guidelines are both the product
of its own reasoned deliberations and the policy choices of Con-
gress, the Commission acted as apologist for the political branches
and added a veneer of post hoc rationalization to sometimes ill-
informed and arbitrary political choices. The warning in Mistretta
v. United States 16-the case that upheld the constitutionality of
mission had tailored to avoid unwarranted disparity caused by the literal terms of the
directive).
114. In commentary in Chapter One, Part A.2 of the Guidelines Manual, added in 2008,
the Commission appears to suggest that Congress can bind judges to guideline ranges by
issuing specific directives to the Commission: "Congress retains the authority to require
certain sentencing practices and may exercise its authority through specific directives to
the Commission with respect to the guidelines." To support this proposition, the Commis-
sion cited a passage from Kimbrough. Read in context and in full, however, this passage
responds to a government argument that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act "implicitly" required the
Commission to write guidelines corresponding to the mandatory minimums. The Court
said: "Drawing meaning from silence is particularly inappropriate here, for Congress has
shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms. For example,
Congress has specifically required the Sentencing Commission to set Guideline sentences
for serious recidivist offenders 'at or near' the statutory maximum. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
994(h)." Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 571.
The Court did not mean that judges must follow guidelines based on statutory
directives. Even the government recognized that this would make the resulting guideline
mandatory, and is thus impermissible. See Brief of the United States at 29, Kimbrough v.
United States ("As long as Congress expresses its will wholly through the Guidelines sys-
tem, the policies in the Guidelines will best be understood as advisory under Booker and
subject to the general principles of sentencing in section 3553(a)"). See also Letter stating
position of the United States on the career offender guideline, docketed March 17, 2008, in
United States v. Funk, No. 05-3708, 3709 (6th Cir.) (the "position of the United States" is
that "Kimbrough's reference to [§ 994(h)] reflected the conclusion that Congress intended
the Guidelines to reflect the policy stated in Section 994(h), not that the guideline imple-
menting that policy binds federal courts.") (emphasis in original), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdfjlib[Funkausa-Letter.pdf.
115. The Supreme Court upheld the promulgation of the Guidelines by the Commission
against Separation of Powers challenge, "not without difficulty," based in part on a predic-
tion that the Commission would not be enlisted in the work of the political branches, but
instead would bring 'Judicial experience and expertise" to the "neutral endeavor" of sen-
tencing, "the Judicial Branch's own business." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
407-08 (1989).
116. 488 U.S. at 407.
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the Commission against a separation of powers challenge-has too
often gone unheeded:
The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation
may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work
in the neutral colors of judicial action.
Sentencing judges considering a particular guideline's recom-
mendation cannot change its pedigree, but they should not ignore
it.
A contrast between mandatory minimum statutes and the
guidelines helps highlight judges' responsibilities under the advi-
sory guidelines. Judges are sometimes required to impose manda-
tory minimum statutory penalties that they view as excessive and
unfair. Many have explained in open court that they disagree
with the sentence, but are nonetheless bound by the law."1 7 While
the excessive sentence must still be imposed, responsibility for the
unfair policy is clear to the defendant, his or her family, and the
voting public.
Defendants receiving a sentence within a guideline range
should be able to expect that it reflects the independent, neutral
judgment of the Sentencing Commission, as promised in the SRA,
as well as the independent judgment of the sentencing court that
the guideline recommendation satisfies the principles and purpos-
es of sentencing, given the facts of the defendant's case. Judges
who do not test the guideline recommendation against the statute
risk adding another veneer of impartiality to recommendations
that may not, in fact, have been developed by the Commission to
identify the sentences that are "sufficient, but not greater than
necessary" to achieve the purposes of sentencing. More than ever,
after Booker, sentencing judges are the final guardians of fair, ef-
fective, and impartial sentencing.
117. David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons from
Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2008); David
M. Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9
Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 645 (2004).
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